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Abstract
The application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis has been a growth area
recently. Most of the attention has been paid to the design of languages for the speci%cation
of cryptographic protocols and algorithms for evaluating their security. However, the ability to
specify their desired behavior correctly is also important; indeed many perceived protocol 2aws
arise out of a misunderstanding of the protocol’s requirements. In this paper, we give a survey
of research in requirements speci%cation for formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. We start
with a brief history of the use of requirements speci%cation for cryptographic protocols. We then
outline some of the main current trends and areas of research. We conclude with a discussion
of some open problems.
c© 2003 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols; Formal methods; Requirements engineering
1. Introduction
Cryptographic protocols must be able to process transactions securely in face of
an intruder who may have complete control of a network, that is, who may be able to
monitor, delete, alter, or redirect tra:c, who has access operations such as encryption
available to legitimate principals, and who may be in league with one or more legiti-
mate but dishonest principals. As a result, it is widely acknowledged that it is di:cult
to design such protocols correctly. Indeed, Anderson and Needham [50] have compared
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the problem to that of “Programming Satan’s Computer,” that is, writing a program on
a computer that is capable of returning subtly incorrect answers designed to subvert
the program’s goals.
On the other hand, it has often been pointed out that, although it is di:cult to
get cryptographic protocols right, what is really di:cult is not the design of the pro-
tocol itself, but of the requirements. Many problems with security protocols arise,
not because the protocol as designed did not satisfy its requirements, but because
the requirements were not well understood in the %rst place. Not surprisingly, the
realization of this fact has lead to a considerable amount of research in the formu-
lation and formalization of security requirements for cryptographic protocols. How-
ever, most of this literature is scattered, and unlike the topic of cryptographic pro-
tocol analysis in general, there is little existing survey work providing roadmaps to
readers interested in learning more about the topic. 1 In this paper, we attempt to
remedy this de%ciency by providing a brief history and survey of the work that has
been done in this area, and outlining what we consider to be some of the open
problems.
Any scheme for expressing requirements should satisfy three properties:
1. It should be expressive enough to specify properties of interest.
2. It should be unambiguous, and preferably compatible with some system for formal
analysis.
3. It should be easy to read and write.
It will be helpful to keep these three properties in mind as we proceed through our
survey.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin Section 2 by describing some of the
early approaches to the formal speci%cation of cryptographic protocol requirements,
including that of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham. In Section 3, we describe some of
the main current approaches to requirements in terms of a spectrum from extensional
to intensional requirements. We also discuss two topics of particular interest: require-
ments speci%cation in the popular strand space theory, and the use of non-interference
to provide a framework for correspondence properties. In Section 4, we discuss several
emerging areas of research: graphical languages for specifying cryptographic proto-
col requirements, requirements for anonymity systems, requirements for protocol prop-
erties other than safety, and expression of quantitative requirements. In Section 5,
we sum up what we believe to be some of the open problems, and conclude the
paper.
We oHer one caveat here: we are not oHering a survey of formal analysis of crypto-
graphic protocol in general, but only as it pertains to the formulation and formalization
of requirements. Thus, we leave out much important work in the area in general (for
example, the recent valuable work in complexity and decidability of crypto protocol
analysis, and much of the work on developing specialized languages, formal systems,
1 We note, however, that the recently published book by Boyd and Mathuria [6] provides an exception to
this, covering much of the same ground that we do in Section 3.1 of this paper.
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and tools), and concentrate mostly on work in which diHerent types of requirements
were %rst identi%ed and formalized.
2. Early work in cryptographic protocol requirements
Most of the existing approaches to applying formal methods to cryptographic pro-
tocol analysis stem ultimately from that of Dolev and Yao [14], who developed the
%rst formalization of the intruder model that is commonly used today. However, since
Dolev and Yao’s work and its immediate successors were mainly focused on theo-
retical results about the complexity of cryptographic protocol analysis, only one type
of requirement was considered, and that was the simplest: that some term or set of
terms designated as secret should not be learned by the intruder. Some of the earlier
work on automated cryptographic protocol analysis, such as the %rst versions of the
Interrogator [35], also restricted itself to this limited de%nition of secrecy. Others, such
as the earlier versions of the NRL Protocol Analyzer (NPA) [30], allowed the user
to specify security in terms of the unreachability of insecure states. The user could
specify a state by specifying terms known by the intruder and values of local state
variables. Thus, one might specify a state in which the intruder knew a secret key by
describing the state as one in which the intruder knew the value of a state variable
local to an honest principal that held a key used for communication with another hon-
est principal. However, the user was not given any further assistance in constructing
requirements.
Probably, the %rst formal cryptographic protocol analysis system to provide a real
mechanism for constructing formal requirements was the belief logic of Burrows,
Abadi, and Needham (BAN) [7].
BAN logic does not address secrecy at all. Rather it con%nes itself to questions
of authentication. Questions that BAN logic can be used to decide have to do with
beliefs the participating principals could derive about origin and use of information
such as:
1. Where does the information come from?
2. What is the information intended for?
3. Is the information new, or is it a replay?
4. Who else has these beliefs about the information?
One uses BAN logic by attempting to see which of these beliefs can be derived
from an idealization of the protocol. The BAN logic does not dictate which beliefs
a protocol should be able to satisfy; rather it is up to the protocol analyst to decide
what beliefs a protocol should guarantee, and to determine if those beliefs can be
derived from the protocol. Thus, one might require that Alice believes that K is a
good key for communicating for Bob, and that Bob believes that K is a good key
for communicating with Alice, but one might or might not want to require that Alice
believes that Bob believes that K is a good key for communicating with Alice, and
vice versa. Thus, BAN logic provides what it probably the %rst formal system for
specifying cryptographic protocol requirements.
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3. Formulating and expressing standard cryptographic protocol requirements
3.1. Secrecy and correspondence
In the early to mid-1990s, the approach to cryptographic protocol veri%cation tended
towards the application of general-purpose tools such as model checkers and theorem
provers. With this came the need to develop means for specifying the properties one
was attempting to prove. Since, in general, researchers were now reasoning directly
about messages passed in a protocol, rather than about beliefs that were developed as
a result of receiving those messages, it now made sense to develop requirements in
terms of messages sent and received rather than beliefs derived.
As is the case for requirements in general, requirements for cryptographic protocols
tend to fall into two categories, extensional and intensional. Extensional systems provide
a small set of generic requirements that can be de%ned independently of the details
of any particular protocol. Intensional systems provide languages and techniques that
can be used to specify requirements for speci%c protocols in terms of the protocols
themselves. This concept was %rst discussed in detail in the context of cryptographic
protocols by Roscoe in [39]. He noted that the earlier work in cryptographic protocol
requirements, such as BAN, leaned to the extensional side, and he showed how one
might specify intensional protocol requirements in CSP.
Requirements for cryptographic protocols also fall into two classes that are related
to the properties that such protocols are intended to enforce: secrecy and correspon-
dence. Secrecy requirements describe who should have access to data. Correspon-
dence requirements describe dependencies between events that occur in a protocol,
and are usually used to express authentication properties. These two types of re-
quirements later turned out to be more closely related than one might think (both
Syverson and Meadows [46] and Schneider [40] de%ne secrecy requirements as a
type of correspondence requirement), but for the moment we shall treat them as
separate.
Of course, not all requirements can be characterized in terms of secrecy and corre-
spondence. In particular, secrecy and correspondence are both safety properties, that is,
properties that are de%ned in terms of certain events not happening, so any non-safety
requirements (such as fairness and its relatives, which are relevant for many electronic
commerce protocols) will not fall into either of these two categories. However, se-
crecy and correspondence cover most requirements relevant to authentication and key
exchange, and thus make a good starting point.
At %rst, correspondence requirements appeared to be the most subtle and complex.
Thus, the earlier work tended to concentrate on these. Moreover, the emphasis was on
extensional requirements and the ability to characterize a general notion of correspon-
dence in a single de%nition. Probably the %rst work in this area was that of Bird et al.
[5]. In the introduction to their paper, they describe an error-free protocol run between
two principals A and B to be one in which all executions viewed by both parties match
exactly one-to-one. This idea is re%ned by Di:e et al. [13] to the idea of matching
protocol runs, which says that at the time Alice completes a protocol the other party’s
record of the run matches Alice’s. This notion was further re%ned and formalized by
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Bellare and Rogaway [4] to the notion of matching conversations, which developed
the idea in terms of a complexity-theoretic framework.
Such general notions of correspondence can be very useful, but they do have a
drawback. They can be used to determine whether or not information was distributed
correctly, but they can not be used to determine whether or not all information that
should have been authenticated was included in the run.
To see what we mean, we consider the attack found by Lowe [27] on the Station-
to-Station protocol of [13]. The protocol is de%ned as follows. We use the standard
notation for representing cryptographic protocols. A→ B :M means that A sends mes-
sage M to B, EK (X ) stands for X encrypted with key K . SB(X ) stands for X signed
with B’s private key.
1. A→ B : xNA .
2. B → A : xNB ; EK (SB(xNA ; xNB)), where K is the Di:e–Hellman key generated by A
and B using xNA and xNB .
3. A→ B : EK (SA(xNB ; xNA)).
Lowe’s attack runs as follows:
1. A → B : xNA . An intruder I intercepts this message and forwards it to B, as if it
came from C.
2. B→ IC : xNB ; EK (SB(xNA ; xNB)). The intruder forwards this message to A.
Thus, at the end of A’s run, A believes that it shares a key with B. B, however, thinks
that C is trying to establish a connection with it, and it will reject A’s %nal message
when it receives it, because it is expecting con%rmation from C, not A. On the other
hand, the protocol does satisfy the matching protocol runs de%nition of security, since
A’s picture of the authenticated portions of the messages is the same as B’s. Indeed,
this is the protocol used to illustrate the concept by Di:e et al. [13].
Lowe’s attack, of course, does not mean the Station-to-Station protocol is insecure.
(Indeed, this very feature of that protocol is seen as a desirable property in the latest
version of IKEv2, the proposed replacement to the Internet Key Exchange protocol [22];
we will discuss the implications of this in more detail later on). All it does is to show
that, if the name of the intended recipient is not included in the responder’s message, a
de%nition of security that is speci%ed in terms of conditions on correspondence between
messages will not catch lack of agreement on information that is never sent.
Lowe’s solution to this problem in [27] was to strengthen the matching protocol
runs requirement to include the condition that when A completes a protocol run with
B, then not only should the two protocol runs match, but B should believe that he
has been running the protocol with A. In a later paper [28], he developed this idea
further, developing a hierarchy of authentication requirements which gave conditions
of varying degrees of strictness on the conclusions a principal A could draw about B’s
view of the protocol after completing the protocol with B. These were then formalized
using the process algebra CSP.
The least restrictive requirement Lowe gave was liveness, which simply requires
that, when A completes a run of the protocol, apparently with B, then B has also been
running the protocol. Moving further up the hierarchy, we require A and B to agree on
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messages sent as well as identities (this requirement corresponds roughly to matching
protocol runs), to agree on the roles they are playing, to agree on the values of speci%c
data items, and so forth.
We see now that we are moving away from extensional requirements that can be
speci%ed independently of the protocol, and more to intensional requirements. If princi-
pals need to agree on speci%c data items, we need to specify what these data items are,
and where they occur in the protocol. The next step would be to specify the conditions
on events that occur in protocols. Indeed, it should be possible to specify the types of
requirements in which we are interested using the temporal logics that are generally
used to provide correctness speci%cations for model checkers.
This is the sort of reasoning that lay behind Syverson and Meadows’ development of
a requirements language for the NRL protocol analyzer [46], which eventually became
known as the NRL protocol analyzer temporal requirements language (NPATRL). The
idea is to develop a simple temporal language that can be used to specify the type
of requirements that are commonly used in authentication and key distribution pro-
tocols. The atomic components of the language correspond to events in the protocol
(e.g. the sending and receiving of messages, or the intruder’s learning a term). Besides
the usual logical connectives, it contains only one temporal operator, − , or “happened
previously.” The use of this single logical operator re2ects the fact that most corre-
spondence requirements can be expressed in terms of events that must have or must
have not occurred before some other events.
Although NPATRL is a very simple language, we have found it to be useful for
specifying some widely varying types of cryptographic protocols. These include key
distribution and key agreement protocols [47,48], complex electronic commerce proto-
cols such as SET [32], and, most recently, group key distribution protocols [33].
One interesting result is that NPATRL has turned out to be useful for specifying
complex secrecy requirements as well as complex authentication requirements. Early
requirements for secrecy simply designated some information, such as keys, as secret,
and all that needed to be guaranteed was that these keys would not be available to
an intruder. However, more recently, requirements such as perfect forward secrecy put
other conditions on an intruder learning a term. Perfect forward secrecy requires that,
if a master key is compromised, then an intruder can only learn a session key if it was
generated after the compromise, not before. This property is satis%ed, for example,
by protocols that make use of authenticated Di:e–Hellman, such as the Station-to-
Station protocol. If the keys used to generate the digital signatures in that protocol are
compromised, then an intruder can mount a man in the middle attack on the protocol
to trick principals into accepting new keys which it knows. But it cannot use its
knowledge of the signature keys to help in the compromise of already generated and
accepted keys. Such a requirement, in which the temporal relationship between two
types of key compromise is paramount, is straightforward to specify using a temporal
language.
However, temporal systems are not necessary to specify most standard correspon-
dence and secrecy properties. By now, it is safe to say that it is standard for any system
developed for cryptographic protocol analysis to have the ability to express both se-
crecy and correspondence properties, where secrecy means that the intruder does not
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Fig. 1. Strand space speci%cation of Needham–Schroeder.
learn certain data, and correspondence means that if a certain event occurs, then certain
other events occurred previously. A study of the way diHerent formal systems handle
these requirements would be illuminating (for example, diHerent systems allow diHerent
amount of expressiveness in describing the order in which events preceding the %nal
event may occur, as well as diHerent levels of support in expressing complex require-
ments); however, space does not allow us to go into more detail about that here. In the
next two sections, we restrict ourselves to two special cases: strand spaces, because
they have become an extremely popular language for specifying protocols and their
requirements, and non-interference, because it oHers a framework in which a whole
class of correspondence requirements can be represented.
3.2. Strand spaces
A discussion of intensional speci%cations in cryptographic protocol analysis would
not be complete without a discussion of strand spaces. This is a formalism that was
mainly intended to facilitate protocol speci%cation and analysis, but it has useful appli-
cations for requirements speci%cation as well. Strand spaces [17] are well-known and
popular models for cryptographic protocol analysis, in which the actions of principals
are modeled in terms of graphs. A strand represents a principal executing a role in a
protocol. The sending and receiving of messages is represented by positive and nega-
tive nodes. Nodes that represent one event immediately preceding another on a strand
are connected by double arrows. A bundle is a collection of strands, in which posi-
tive send nodes can be connected to negative receive nodes via a single arrow if the
message sent matches the message received. For example, we include a strand space
representation of the initiator’s role in the Needham–Schroeder public key protocol,
using KX to stand for X ’s public key (Fig. 1).
If this had been represented in the conventional notation we used earlier for the
Station-to-Station protocol, it would appear as follows:
1. A→ B : KB(NA; KA),
2. B→ A : KA(NA; NB),
3. A→ B : KB(NB).
One advantage of strand spaces is that one can characterize a principal’s execution
of a role in an instance of a protocol in terms of a single strand, parametrized with
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appropriate data values. For example, the Needham–Schroeder protocol requires an
initiator A to send a nonce NA to a principal B, and to receive a nonce NB from B,
and B to do likewise with respect to A. We could represent this by two parametrized
stands: INIT [A; B; NA; NB] and RESP[B; A; NB; NA], and say that the protocol is correct
if for every bundle containing a strand INIT [A; B; NA; NB] there is one and only one
instance of RESP[B; A; NB; NA].
The originators of strand spaces did not provide a formal requirements speci%ca-
tion language, but we note that others who have made use of strand spaces have, see
for example Song’s Athena model checker [45]. Parametrized strands may provide the
most succinct way of specifying a large class of intensional requirements for crypto-
graphic protocols. They do, however, lose some expressiveness, since it is di:cult to
specify which individual actions (e.g. sends, receives) should precede which others. In
the section on graphical requirements, we will discuss how this capability might be
reincorporated.
3.3. Non-interference
Non-interference was originally developed for the study of security in multilevel
secure systems, that is, systems that must protect data classi%ed at diHerent security
levels. One goal of such a system is to prevent data classi%ed at high to processes who
have legal access to data classi%ed at low via covert channels. We say that a system
is non-interfering if the behavior visible to a low process is the same whether or not
any high processes are present. Non-interference, as originally de%ned by Goguen and
Meseguer [19], was formulated in terms of conditions on traces, but it has also been
couched in terms of state machines, process algebras, and logics of knowledge and
belief (for the last, see Halpern and O’Neill [21]).
Non-interference might seem to be an odd choice for modeling encryption proto-
cols, since it does not really appear to be that compatible with encryption. But non-
interference is used in a somewhat unexpected way by Durante et al. [15]. Instead of
identifying the secret data as high, one identi%es the intruder with the high process and
the honest principals with the low processes. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure
if the low behavior, de%ned in terms of initial initiator events and %nal initiator and
responder events, is the same whether or not the intruder is present.
The non-interference approach to security requirements is not only highly exten-
sional, but it may also be overly restrictive. For example, it is more restrictive than
matching conversations. It is easy to see that if a protocol satis%es non-interference
it will satisfy matching conversations, since matching conversations is achieved in the
absence of an intruder. On the other hand, the Station-to-Station protocol achieves
matching conversations, but not non-interference.
More recently, Focardi et al. [18] have developed a more inclusive system for spec-
ifying requirements called generalized non-deducibility on composition, or GNDC. It
is de%ned as follows.
Let P be a process representing a cryptographic protocol operating in the absence of
an intruder. Let (P‖X ) denote the composition of P with an intruder X . Let  denote a
function from processes to processes where (P) is a process describing the “correct”
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behavior of P. Let ≈ denote a preorder. Let C denote the set of channels between
honest principals, and let Q\C denote the restriction of a process Q to C. Then a
process satis%es GNDC≈, if, for all intruders X
(P‖X )\C ≈ (P):
In the case that  is the identity function and ≈ is trace equivalence, the prop-
erty becomes NDC, or non-deducibility on composition, which requires that the traces
produced by the process in composition with an intruder be the same as the traces
produced by the process in the absence of the intruder. This can be thought of as an
information-2ow property in which the intruder and P play the part of high and low,
respectively, corresponding to the standard multilevel application of non-interference
for multilevel security [19]. NDC, since it requires that a process behave in the pres-
ence of an intruder exactly as it would behave in the absence, is more stringent than
any of the other requirements that have been discussed in this section.
Moreover, GNDC provides a framework that allows one to specify less restrictive
requirements such as the various forms of correspondence discussed earlier, and the
types of requirements that would be de%ned in a temporal language such as NPATRL.
Thus, GNDC can be thought of as providing a general framework for requirements,
including requirements that go beyond the usual notions of correspondence, such as
liveness. Note also, that GNDC and, in particular, NDC are not safety properties,
although in the case that the number of traces is %nite, it is possible to check whether
NDC holds by comparing the sets of traces produced by both processes. This means that
it should also be possible to use GNDC to specify liveness properties for cryptographic
protocols, about which we will learn more in Section 5.
We note also that non-deducibility on composition is not necessarily the strongest
possible de%nition of security. Our candidate for that would be Gong and Syverson’s
[20] fail-stop property. It basically says that at any point in a protocol’s execution, if it
deviates from its normal behavior, then that deviation is detected and the execution is
halted. This is a stronger requirement than any of the others that we have seen, since it
puts conditions on partial executions as well as completed ones. We conjecture that it
should be straightforward to incorporate the fail-stop de%nition of correctness into the
GNDC framework by incorporating all send and receive events in the model instead
of just initial and %nal events.
4. Graphical requirements languages
Languages and frameworks such as NPATRL and GNDC allow us increasing 2exi-
bility and expressiveness for specifying requirements. But, the ability to specify more
complex and subtle requirements also has a cost; the requirements become more dif-
%cult to comprehend and write. In this section, we discuss two graphical approaches
to increasing the ease of handling such speci%cations that make use of some of the
common features of cryptographic protocols and their requirements.
The %rst of these is known as strand space pictures [16], based on the strand space
model described earlier in Section 3. This model facilitates the graphical representation
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of protocols, and [16] actually describes a number of ways in which the graphical
features of strand spaces could be used. But the one of most interest to us is the way
in which they can be used to represent requirements. Using strand space representation
of protocols, it is possible to represent correspondence requirements in terms of relative
placement of strands. Thus, if we want to specify a correspondence requirement which
requires that if certain messages are accepted, then other messages were sent previously,
we can represent sending and receipt of the messages we are interested in by portions
of strands, and we can use the placement of the strands (so that earlier nodes appear
above later ones) to indicate which events we want to occur before others. This not
only gives us a convenient graphical way of expressing requirements, but is somewhat
more expressive than the more common use of expressing requirements in terms of
conditions on the existence of parametrized strands.
The strand space pictures methodology, was never, as far as we know, developed into
a full-2edged procedure with well-de%ned ways for representing major classes of re-
quirements. However, in [16] the authors give several examples which show how some
standard requirements such as freshness or agreement properties could be represented
in this framework.
A somewhat diHerent approach has been taken by Cervesato and Meadows [10] in the
development of a graphical representation of the NPATRL language. This representation
was based on the fact that queries in the NRL Protocol Analyzer, for which NPATRL
was designed, are couched in terms of events that should or should not precede some
speci%ed event. Such a way of formatting queries has an obvious connection to fault
trees. A fault tree is a graphical means of representing failure modes in safety-critical
systems. The root of the tree represents the failure with which the system designer is
concerned, and the branches represent the conditions under which the fault can occur.
The main diHerence between NPA queries and fault trees is that in NPA queries the
relationship is one of precedence, while in fault trees it is one of causality. Otherwise
the structure is very similar. Moreover, the graphical representation makes it easier to
understand the relationships between the various events. For this reason, it was found
helpful, in particular, to represent the GDOI requirements, especially the more complex
ones, in terms of fault trees. In [10], a fault tree semantics for the subset of NPATRL
requirements accepted by the NPA is developed, and some sample requirements are
shown.
To see how the approach would work, consider the two speci%cations given in
Fig. 2. They describe two types of freshness for the GDOI group key. The arrows
map to “implies happened before,” the straight lines with a cross map to “happened
before,” while the unadorned straight lines are simple connectors. The triangular gate
represents negation, while the curved gate represents disjunction.
The requirement represented, recency freshness, says that, assuming that the pairwise
key between member and key server (gcks) used to authenticate the key was not
compromised, if a group member accepts a group key, then the key should not have
expired before the group member requested it (the event “gcks createkey” describes
the expiration of the old key as well as the creation of the new key). The second
says that, assuming that the pairwise key is not compromised, the member should not
accept a key if it accepted a more recently generated key earlier.
C. Meadows / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 3–22 13
Fig. 2. Freshness requirements for the GDOI pull protocol: (a) recency freshness, (b) sequential freshness.
5. Requirements for emerging applications
Most of the protocols that have been analyzed in the literature involve key distri-
bution and authentication. However, there are a number of other applications to which
cryptography can be applied that have been emerging in recent years, including elec-
tronic commerce, tra:c analysis prevention, and denial of service prevention. We take
a brief look at each of these below, and then discuss some of the general requirements
speci%cation issues that arise.
5.1. Electronic commerce
Electronic commerce protocols must satisfy many of the same properties as key
distribution and authentication protocols, but there are some important diHerences, as
follows:
1. Many electronic commerce protocols involve non-safety properties such as fairness,
which says essentially that no party should have an advantage over the other one at
any point of the protocol. For example, consider a protocol whose goal is that each
principal should receive a contract signed by the other. Such a protocol would be
considered fair if it there were no way in which a principal could receive a contract
without the other principal receiving one. Another example would be a protocol for
processing payments. Such a protocol would be considered fair if the there was
no way in which the purchasing agent’s account could be debited without its also
receiving the goods.
2. The threat model is somewhat more complex than as in Dolev–Yao. Instead of a
dishonest intruder pitted against honest principals who follow all the rules of the
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protocol, we have semi-honest principals who will not act against their own interest,
but may cheat to gain an unfair advantage. However, the model may still include
parties trusted to obey the rules, as well as the Dolev–Yao intruder. For example,
consider an electronic commerce protocol in which two principals are monitored
by a trusted third party. The two principals may try to cheat each other, but they
are assumed not to be likely to engage in any activity which will cause them to
lose money. The trusted third party, on the other hand, is assumed to follow all the
rules of the protocol. The protocol may also be attacked by outsiders, who may be
assumed to behave like the Dolev–Yao intruder.
3. The outcomes of the protocols may be quantitative as well as qualitative; for exam-
ple, one may allow one party to gain advantage over another, but put a limit on the
degree of advantage that may be attained. Since electronic commerce protocols usu-
ally involve money, it is often straight-forward to derive such quantitative measures
of success.
There is a long history of formulating and characterizing the diHerent properties
necessary for electronic commerce protocols, although many of these de%nitions are
tied to particular protocols, and few are formulated with the idea of formal analysis
in mind. Markowitch et al. [29] give a survey of the various notions of fairness of
exchange protocols, a class of electronic commerce protocols that involves the exchange
of goods, information, or commitments. They also provide an informal statement of the
desirable properties of an exchange protocol, which we can think of as the exchange
protocol’s version of the “secrecy and authentication” formulations of authentication
and key distribution protocols in the last section. These de%ned by Markowitch et al.
as follows: viability (it must be possible for the protocol to complete), fairness (the
quality of the communication channel being %xed, either all parties attain their goals
or none do), and timeliness (the quality of the communication channel being %xed,
the parties have the ability to reach a point in which they can abort while preserving
fairness). Optional properties include non-repudiability (no party should have the ability
to deny having participated in the protocol) and abuse-freeness (no single entity should
be able to prove to an outside party that it has the power both to terminate and complete
the protocol).
It is not always clear how to formulate such properties so that they are amenable
to automated analysis. We consider abuse-freeness as an example, as it has recently
received a lot of attention from the formal methods community. The di:culty in the
case of abuse-freeness is the notion of being able to prove to an outside party that
one has a certain capability; the notion of “proof” is a very general one, and di:cult
to capture formally. Most attempts at modeling abuse-freeness have either left of the
provability condition or modeled it in a very limited sense. For example, Shmatikov
and Mitchell [44] and Chadha et al. [11] drop the provability criterion and simply
consider the stronger requirement that there be no state in which one of the parties can
determine the outcome of the protocol. ButtyRan and Hubaux [8] tackle another property
similar to but weaker than abuse-freeness: rational exchange, which says that if it party
deviates from the protocol, it does not gain any advantage by doing so. They show
how this can be naturally formulated in a game-theoretic model. Kremer and Raskin
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[25] address the notion of provability, but in a strictly limited sense. They de%ne the
ability to prove in terms of the ability to produce a digitally signed message from a
principal starting the protocol, and the ability to complete or abort is described in terms
of strategies available to a principal. They then come up with a stronger property than
abuse-freeness, which says that, at any point in the protocol, it should be impossible for
a single principal to display a digitally signed message from another party saying that
it started the protocol, unless the other party has a strategy to successfully complete
the protocol.
We can see from this brief history that the problem of specifying and characterizing
non-safety properties for electronic commerce protocols is even more challenging and
varied than the problem of specifying properties of key distribution and authentication
protocols, and that there are still a lot of issues to be worked out. For example, it might
be possible to get a better approximation of the meaning of the notion of proving to
an outside party by using a non-interference-based approach: a principal A is unable
to prove to a principal B that an event occurred if, for any set of actions by A, the
set of all traces visible to B in which the event occurred is the same as the set of all
traces visible to B in which the event did not occur.
5.2. Denial of service
Denial of service attacks generally fall into two broad categories: redirection attacks,
in which a principal is tricked into believing that a resource is not available, and
resource exhaustion attacks, in which a principal is tricked into expending its resources
until they are exhausted. Redirection attacks can be prevented by the appropriate use of
authentication, and techniques covered in Section 3 should be adequate for specifying
their prevention.
Resource exhaustion attacks are more tricky. It is probably impossible to prevent
them completely, but, if one can identify the source or sources of the attacks, one can
stop the attack by refusing any further communication from those sources. Thus, au-
thentication can be used to curtail resource exhaustion attacks. This can be summed up
by a design principle that says that one should delay operations that expend resources
until authentication is in place. On the other hand, strong authentication also requires
the use of resources, and could itself be exploited in a resource exhaustion attack. This
has lead to the design of protocols that use weak but cheap authentication %rst followed
by stronger but more expensive encryption later. Meadows [31] formalizes these two
principles in a model based on Gong and Syverson’s fail-stop model, augmented with
a cost function that can be used to compare the resources expended by the attacker
with the resources expended by a victim. Resistance against denial of service is then
de%ned in terms of an attacker’s inability to make a protocol diverge from normal
behavior (as de%ned in the fail-stop model) without expending substantially more re-
sources than the defender. More recently, LaFrance and Mullins [26] have adapted this
approach to modeling resistance to denial of service to a model based on information
2ow.
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5.3. Tra4c analysis
The goal of tra:c analysis is to %nd out the source and destination of tra:c. In recent
years, there has been an increasing amount of work in the design and implementation
of anonymizing networks that prevent such analysis, although the history of research
in this area goes back to Chaum’s [12] work in the 1980s.
Anonymity is clearly a kind of secrecy, but it is diHerent than secrecy of a key.
In the latter case, one is trying to hide the value of a particular piece of data. In
the former, one is trying to hide the relationship between two pieces of data: the
relationship between the sender (or receiver) of a message, and the message itself.
Thus, an attacker might know the contents of a message, and know the identities of
all principals present in a network, but not know which principal sent the message or
which received it.
The %rst formalization of anonymity was due to Merritt [34]. This was the notion of
hidden automorphisms. Consider a network with a set of principals and an action where
one of these principals sends a message. Consider now an automorphism that changes
the names of the principals. If an observer’s view of the network is left unchanged
by the application of such an automorphism, we can say that observer is ignorant of
the sender of the message. More recently, Schneider and Spirodopoulos [41] used a
similar de%nition of anonymity de%ned on CSP processes to analyze Chaum’s dining
cryptographer’s protocol [12]. In this de%nition, anonymity on a set of events means
that events from that set should be indistinguishable to an observer in the sense that
if one could have occurred then so could have any. Thus, a set of permutations on an
anonymity system would behave like Merritt’s hidden automorphisms.
The above models describe various forms of perfect anonymity. But this is generally
too strong a requirement. Realistic systems are generally only able to provide partial
anonymity. An intruder who can observe message tra:c over time can, in general,
piece together some partial information. What is needed is to bound the intruder’s
ability to do this, for example, by determining the rate at which it can learn identities of
senders and receivers, or the probability of its correctly guessing senders’ and receivers’
identities at some point in time.
There have been several approaches taken to this problem:
1. Model an intruder of limited ability: This is what is done by Syverson and Stub-
blebine in [49]. They note that it may be unrealistic to require an anonymity system
to be secure against an omnipresent omniscient intruder. Instead, they posit a group
of intruders who may be able to share some information, but not all the time, and
will have access to diHerent parts of the network. They describe the diHerent types
of assumptions about the ways in which groups of attackers can share information,
and develop a calculus for deriving the diHerent types of information the principals
can share.
To consider an example of the type of problems that such a calculus could take,
consider two intruders, each of whom is eavesdropping on a diHerent set of loca-
tions of a network, trying to determine the sender of a particular message. In the
Syverson–Stubblebine calculus, each combination of locating and eavesdropper is
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considered a principal, and each intruder may be thought of as a collective group of
such principals, such that any information known by one principal is known by the
collective. What each collective group knows from its eavesdropping is an or-group
of possible senders of the message. The two principals, assuming that they cannot
or do not communicate, form an or-group of their own. If they do communicate,
they form a larger collective group.
2. Specify the information which must be hidden from an attacker: This approach
is taken by Hughes and Shmatikov [23]. They develop a logic for describing the
diHerent types of features one might want an anonymizing network to hide from an
attacker attempting to perform tra:c analysis, such as preventing an attacker from
distinguishing individuals in a set of possible senders and receivers of a message,
revealing the type but not the identify of a sender or receiver (e.g. merchant or
customer in an electronic commerce protocol), revealing the identity of all senders
of messages in the system but not revealing which sender sent which message, hiding
whether or not two messages have the same sender, and so forth. They show how a
number of diHerent types of anonymity can be formalized in their system, including
the diHerent guarantees oHered by most of the currently available anonymity systems.
3. Specify the intruder’s ability to guess information about the sender or receiver
of a message: Most actual attacks on anonymity protocols do not give an attacker
actual knowledge of the sender or receiver of a message; rather, they increase the
chance that an attacker’s guess might be correct. Thus, it would be useful to be
able to formulate requirements in terms of such probabilistic measures. In general,
it is di:cult to do this in a way such that meaningful formal analysis is possible,
given the discrete nature of most tools. However, probabilistic model checkers are
beginning to become available, and in the cases when it is possible to apply them to
the problem it makes sense to formulate probabilistic requirements. This is done by
Shmatikov in [38,43] in which the protocols and their requirements are modeled in
terms of Markov chains, making them amenable to analysis by probabilistic model
checkers.
5.4. Incorporating cryptographic notions of correctness
Although the application of formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis has
attracted a lot of attention recently, analytic methods have a longer history. These
methods derive from lower level, cryptographic considerations, in which correctness
is de%ned in terms of probability and complexity theory. These models are not, in
general, amenable to formal analysis given the capacity of present-day tools, but they
provide a sounder mathematical basis for correctness than the standard models used
for formal methods, which usually rely unsupported on “black-box” assumptions about
the behavior of cryptographic operations.
There is a growing amount of research on unifying the logical models used by for-
mal analysis with the analytic ones used by cryptographers. Some of the earlier work
in this area concentrated on developing logical speci%cation languages that took cryp-
tographic considerations into account. The most complete example of this approach is
probably the work of Mitchell et al. [36]. More recent work, however, is intended to
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have the ultimate eHect of simplifying the expression of requirements, since it con-
centrates on using the cryptographic model as a semantics for the Dolev–Yao model,
thus making it possible to specify requirements at the Dolev–Yao level as long as the
cryptographic assumptions are met. As an example of this latter approach, consider the
work of Abadi and Rogaway [1], which considers a complexity-theory-based model
as a semantics for a logical system, although it restricts itself to secrecy requirements
and passive attackers. More recently, Backes et al. [3] have been developing versions
of such standard properties as fairness and liveness, bisimulation, and non-interference
that are compatible with computational probabilistic notions of cryptographic correct-
ness, and in some cases, have been able to use theorem provers to prove protocols
correct according to these de%nitions. They have also begun work on the development
of a library of cryptographic objects [3] designed so that they can prove that a model
closely akin to the standard Dolev–Yao model is sound with respect to an implemen-
tation developed using the objects in the library and a polynomially bounded intruder.
This, again, should allow one to specify security requirements in terms of the standard
Dolev–Yao model, as long as only objects from the library are used. A similar, but
somewhat diHerent approach, is taken by Canetti [9] in the development of a set of
cryptographic primitives that are universally composable, so that security of the cryp-
toalgorithm is guaranteed even when the protocol is running in an arbitrary multi-party
environment. This property also has the potential to be used to replace the informal
notion of cryptographic soundness in the standard Dolev–Yao model.
5.5. Emerging trends
We can see a number of trends that emerge from the disparate applications that we
have presented here. One is that the attacker model becomes richer and more complex.
Indeed, in several cases we can no longer speak of a single attacker, but a collection
of attackers with diHerent goals and capabilities. In future work on requirements spec-
i%cation, it may be as necessary to concentrate as much on specifying the expected
behavior of the attacker or attackers as it is on the desired behavior of the protocol in
face of the attackers.
Another issue that comes up, particularly in the speci%cation of requirements for
electronic commerce protocols, is the tension between secrecy and authentication that
comes from the diHerent kind of threat model. In the Dolev–Yao model, it is assumed
that the only goal of the attacker is to subvert the goals of the protocol for the other
principals, either by discovering secrets or preventing the detection of incorrect protocol
executions. In the electronic commerce model, there may be a sort of principal of
intermediate honesty who may try to cheat to achieve its own ends, but who will
be trusted not to engage in certain types of behavior that is harmful to itself. Thus,
we may have a situation in which a given principal will not have access to some
types of information, but will need to see certain other types. For example, in the
SET protocol, principals must agree on a transaction without necessarily being able
to see all its components; this greatly complicated the task of specifying the security
requirements in [42].
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An even more outstanding example occurs in the successors to the Internet Key
Exchange. Recall that, as Lowe’s analysis showed, the Station-to-Station protocol does
not satisfy non-repudiation, in the sense that, if Alice initiates a key exchange with
Bob, she can always claim later that she really was attempting to initiate a version of
the protocol with someone else. However, for two of the proposed successors to the
Internet Key Exchange protocol, JFKr [2] and IKEv2 [24], this lack of non-repudiation
becomes a desirable property: “plausible deniability,” which says that an outside party
should have no way of determining whether or not Alice actually initiated the protocol
with Bob. 2 We can consider plausible deniability to be a type of secrecy property
with respect to the outside observer; certain information, that is, the name of the
principal with whom Alice is attempting to communicate, is kept secret from the outside
observer. Thus, we have two contradictory properties: one, non-repudiation, falling more
or less into the class of authentication properties, and the other, plausible deniability,
falling more or less into the class of secrecy properties.
Tensions such as the above arise when there are diHerent stakeholders involved
with diHerent requirements and expectations and only limited trust in one another.
For example, in SET merchants have a requirement for accountability on the part of
customers, while customers have a requirement for protection of their private data
from merchants. As more and more daily transactions that must satisfy parties with
diHerent and often con2icting expectations come to rely on cryptographic protocols, it
is likely that this situation will arise more often. Thus, one of the goals of cryptographic
protocol analysis, as is the case for other complex systems, will be to determine that
the requirements themselves do not contradict each other.
6. Conclusion
We have given a brief survey of research in expressing cryptographic protocol re-
quirements. We believe that at this point we have a good handle on the speci%cation of
the standard secrecy and correspondence requirements of security protocols. It appears
possible to derive techniques that are compatible with just about any type of formal
system, and we have a vast range of requirement speci%cation styles, from one end of
the extensional–intensional spectrum to the other.
There are of course a number of areas in which work on cryptographic protocol
requirements needs to be extended. One is in making the requirements language user-
friendly. Security protocols, and thus their requirements, can be complex; even more
so when one must consider operation in partial failure modes such as compromise
of temporary session keys. Thus, it makes sense to concentrate on ways of making
requirements languages easier to use. In this paper, we discussed some of the work
on graphical requirements languages that attempts to address this problem. Of course,
graphical requirements languages, and other methods for representing complex require-
ments, can only take us so far. We expect that one of the emerging problems in this
2 We do note that in JFKr Bob will be able to tell that Alice initiated the protocol with him, although he
will not be able to prove it to anybody.
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area will not only expressing complex requirements, but limiting the complexity of
such requirements in the %rst place.
There are some other areas which could also use more exploring. For example, many
electronic commerce protocols must satisfy various types of non-safety requirements.
Is it possible to develop ways of characterizing and specifying these requirements in
ways that are particularly relevant to security protocols, as has been done for the
safety properties of secrecy and correspondence? Another area of research has to do
with interoperability. Increasingly, many protocols will rely upon other protocols to
supply some of their security services. What is the best way to specify services needed
by one protocol in terms of requirements upon another? We hope to see research in
these and other emerging areas in the near future.
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